Document information
- University
- Politecnico di Milano
- Degree programme
- Computer Engineering
- Subject
- Game Theory
- Academic year
- 2014-2015
- Classification
- Exam · Full exam
- Content
- Exam paper only
- Original format
- Text
- Searchable text
Full exam for Game Theory in the Computer Engineering degree programme at Politecnico di Milano. The document covers: Game Theory 14-9-2015 Surname: Name: Matricola: Exercise 1 (8p o i n t s) Given the following zero sum game: ✓ 24 a 31 a ◆ , 1. find the conservative values of the two players; 2. find for which a there is an equilibrium in pure strategies and which are the optimal pure strategies
Full exam for Game Theory in the Computer Engineering degree programme at Politecnico di Milano. The document covers: Game Theory 14-9-2015 Surname: Name: Matricola: Exercise 1 (8p o i n t s) Given the following zero sum game: ✓ 24 a 31 a ◆ , 1. find the conservative values of the two players; 2. find for which a there is an equilibrium in pure strategies and which are the optimal pure strategies
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Game Theory 14-9-2015 Surname: Name: Matricola: Exercise 1 (8p o i n t s) Given the following zero sum game: ✓ 24 a 31 a ◆ , 1. find the conservative values of the two players; 2. find for which a there is an equilibrium in pure strategies and which are the optimal pure strategies of the players; 3. (5 cfu) find the optimal strategies of the players if a =3 (8 cfu) find the optimal strategies of the players for di ↵erent values of a> 2. Solution 1. The conservative values of the two players are, respectively, vI = ( a if a 2 2i f a> 2 vII = ( a if a 3 3i f a> 3 2. There is an equilibrium in pure strategies if and only if vI = vII , i.e. for a 2. The optimal strategies for the players if a 2 are (1, 0), (0, 0, 1) and if a 1 there is also (0, 1), (0, 0, 1) . 3. (5 cfu) if a = 3, the third column is dominated by a combination of the first and second column and the optimal strategies of the players are given by ( 1 2 , 1 2 ), ( 3 4 , 1 4 , 0) . (8 cfu) if 2 <a< 5 2 , the optimal strategies of the players are given by (p, 1 p), (0, 0, 1) ,w h e r e a 1 3 p 3 a.I f a = 5 2 , the optimal strategy of the first player is given by ( 1 2 , 1 2 ) and the optimal strategy of the second player is a combination of all the three columns ( q1,q 2, 1 q1 q2) such that 0 q1 < 3 4 , q2 = 1 3 q1.I f a> 5 2 , the third column is dominated by a combination of the first and second column and the optimal strategies of the players are given by ( 1 2 , 1 2 ), ( 3 4 , 1 4 , 0) . 39 Exercise 2 (8p o i n t s) Let ( N, v) be the cooperative game N = {1, 2, 3} such that v({1})= v({2})=0 v({3})=2 v(N )= a v({1, 2})=2 v({1, 3})=0 v({2, 3})=1 1. For which values of a is the core empty? 2. Find and draw the core if a = 4; 3. find the Shapley value of this game 8a; 4. find the Banzhaf value of this…
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