Complete course materials for Business & Industrial Economics in the Management Engineering degree programme at Politecnico di Milano. The document covers: ANTITRUST POLICY 3 lessons State actions, they are an ex post policy, because something wrong should occur to antitrust intervene. It controls what is happening or what had happened. Antitrust policy: they intervene in case of the abusive market power (=type of market failure),
Complete course materials for Business & Industrial Economics in the Management Engineering degree programme at Politecnico di Milano. The document covers: ANTITRUST POLICY 3 lessons State actions, they are an ex post policy, because something wrong should occur to antitrust intervene. It controls what is happening or what had happened. Antitrust policy: they intervene in case of the abusive market power (=type of market failure),
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ANTITRUST POLICY 3 lessons State actions, they are an ex post policy, because something wrong should occur to antitrust intervene. It controls what is happening or what had happened. Antitrust policy: they intervene in case of the abusive market power (=type of market failure), to prevent monopolization of the market. We starts from someone who try to manipulate te market. We need to clarify what is the boundary between what is an anticompetitive strategy from dominance (perfectly dominance) that arise form the perfect competition (this is not a problem, but the abuse it is) Antitrust policy is also de ned as competition policy= rules and actions implemented by the State to protect completion. The abuse of dominance Strategy that dominance player put in action to reduce competition. The anticompetitive agreement is a cartel. The target of the antitrust policy are the illegal exercise of market power, aim at controlling any market power which is based on restriction of competition - intentional monopolization of the market power = eliminare i rivali - Intentionalweakening wearing of competitive Definition: interactions Antitrust policy (Two typical way we depart from competition) We have a price that is higher Target thanpolicy of Antitrust the =competition price,ofand Illegitimate exercise create market powersome e ciency loss. The aim of the antitrust authorities is to re-create competitions. – intentional monopolization of the market – intentional weakening of competitive interactions p abuso del potere di mercato, D prezzo superiore a quello EL MC p del mercato, quindi Q ridotta, con conseguente Q Q efficiency loss – Main goal = Restoring competition and efficiency in product markets ripristinare concorrenza e p D l’efficienza del mercato, nel caso MC della…
- Screening tests (ex pro t sacri ce or economic sense..), Abusive anti-competitive conducts of dominant players may directly drive away or reduce room for competitors: vertical foreclosure and predatory pricing.Vertical foreclosure: Opening – Assessment of esclusione verticale Vertical foreclosure (spiega come un'azienda che controlla un Supply chainobbligato" "passaggio structureinthat unamay support ve liera possa usarlo per fare fuori i concorrenti, l'esclusione verticale avviene quando il conducts monopolista dello Stage A usa il suo potere per avvantaggiare la propria azienda a liata – The “A” stage is a bottleneck for “B” stage firm (Integrated Supplier) a danno del concorrente indipendente.). For example the stage A is the bottleneck for stage B; the dominant rm is the A. And all the rms incompetitive the B stage “B”need stagethe need the service of “A” service monopolist of A stage which is manage by the monopolist. The A incumbent is vertically integrated in B activities. But this situation per se in not and infringement of the competition. • One firm operates the “A” stage An abusive conduct arise when The vertically integrated and monopolistic incumbent of the «A» stage could use the bottleneck to foreclose access to • The “A” incumbent is vertically integrated customers for the independent suppliers of «B» and in • E so doing expand its market power from «A» to «B» stage “B” Integrated Supplier … Independent Supplier c integrated supplier. Two main anticompetitive strategy: v • Discrimination of rivals, it deny the use to B stage “A” e Bottleneck Operator competitors, increase the price or degrade the quality o er, allow less favorable payment to independent competitors, or the capacity to serve rivals is Custom ers strategically restricted • Deep-pocket…
others will punish it. Investigation and the evidence: It proves that independent rms had a clear, shared intention to collude. Example emails, chat logs, meeting minutes, or whistleblower testimonies are used for the investigation. This is the "Traditional focus of investigation" because it provides clear, undeniable proof of a conspiracy. The investigation will look at the actual market behavior of managers and rms, for example identical price hikes or rms staying out of each other's territories. But this is harder to demonstrate, because there could be be other explanation, for ex If two companies raise prices at the same time, it might be because they are colluding, or it might simply be because the price of raw materials or transport costs went up for everyone. But the ability to demonstrate that the behavior of the competitor is di cult to demonstrate: the initial exchange of info can become an anticompetitive strategy and a cartel. Algorithmic pricing: recently concerns have arisen about the development and di usion of more and more sophisticated and «unmanned» algorithmic pricing. They are not responsible for the collusion since the only goal is only maximize pro t, and they found spontaneously a way to collude. So this shift toward "unmanned" systems that can lead to tacit collusion without human input. Before: pricing software followed strict, human-coded rules. Humans were the "brains" behind the strategy. Nowadays: pricing is handled by AI systems that learn autonomously. They operate through constant surveillance of competitors and "active experimentation"—basically trial and error to nd the most pro table price point. Company don’t agree in a explicit way, but the algorithm price system start to colluding without any coordination. They are programmed only…
(allocative ine ciency), and there is a new part present (yellow one, cost reduction bene t, that is a part of pro t created due to the scale economy) Final result, per vedere se il welfare aumenta: Delta W= (Bene t form cost reduction, CR) - (e ciency loss, EL); on the side of customer we have a reduction of the consumer surplus, but we are compensate with the productive e ciency. The antitrust authority will decide if deltaW >0 the merger will be e cient and may be approved; if deltaW<0 the merger will be ine cient and could be rejected. The nal approval of an horizontal merger may be made conditional to the commitment of harm merging rms to enforce a remedy to the possibile har caused by the merger. L'Autorità Antitrust ritiene che una fusione sia potenzialmente dannosa (ad esempio, se l'area verde della slide precedente è troppo grande), ma vuole comunque permetterla a determinate condizioni. La soluzione sono i Commitments (Impegni), ovvero dei "rimedi" che le aziende accettano di attuare per ottenere il via libera. - Structural remedy: the bad e ects of merger can be reduced by changing the post-merger industry structure through divesture, that are commitment in selling one or more business units or facilities or other assets (e.g. patents) in geographic or product markets that would su er the most from a signi cant increase in concentration and market power. - Behavioral remedy: the e ects of merger can be reduced by giving up the most harmful conducts (for example limit in the future a behavior or perform a bene cial conduct such as not to arise price in the next 3 years), but this require the monitoring e orts by the antitrust authority. The vertical mergers: are seen as a lesser cause of concern, they are not investigate, because there are scope economy…
Il DMA non nasce a caso, ma si basa sulla "Teoria del Danno" dell'esclusione verticale. • I Gatekeeper controllano l'accesso alle piattaforme (la "porta"). • I Business Users (sviluppatori di app, testate giornalistiche, venditori su e-commerce) sono aziende indipendenti che dipendono da quella porta per lavorare. • Il problema: Se il Gatekeeper decide di non garantire un accesso equo (perché magari vuole favorire un proprio servizio), questi utenti commerciali vengono "tagliati fuori" dal mercato (foreclosed). L'abuso di posizione dominante non danneggia solo le altre aziende, ma crea un e etto a catena che colpisce tutti: • Le prime vittime (Business Users): Sono gli sviluppatori o i venditori indipendenti. Se non hanno un accesso equo, perdono la capacità di competere e rischiano di fallire. • Le seconde vittime (Consumatori nali): Se i concorrenti indipendenti spariscono o vengono ostacolati, noi utenti riceviamo un servizio peggiore. Antitrust v. regulation of monopolies ◦ Meno scelta: Vediamo solo i prodotti del Gatekeeper. ◦ Minore qualità: Senza concorrenza, il Gatekeeper non Noteworthy: Digital Markets Act belongs to regulatory policy ha incentivi a migliorare i propri – It adopts an ex-ante, preventative approach that is typical in (for servizi o contenuti. example) natural monopoly regulation It is not a proper Antitrust intervention – Different from the case-by-case approach that is typical of antitrust policy – Different from ex-post control of abuse of dominant position and anticompetitive agreements Another fundamental policy for digital sectors in the European The obligations put on the gatekeepers: Union is the Digital Services Act DMA, obligations put on the «gatekeepers» – Objective: protection of users rights – See the Annex “Family” of obligations…
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