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NotesComplete set

Complete course ENG and some NO

Study material for Energy Economics, shared by the Studwiz community and reviewed by moderators.

Energy EconomicsComplete set

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FORMLERENERGYECONOMICS ELASTICITYOFDEMAND:How costumersare sensitivetoa changeinprice UNELASTICE<T (E,0) Sexelectricity)Fewcompetitors 7 "Ifichangepricequantitysoldis almost constant (consumersdon'tchangetheir behavior). ELASTIC ECT (ex.pasta)hotofcompetitorsIfichangepricequantitysoldvarya lot becauseconsumers willchangetheirbehaviours COSTFUNCTION: # IC TC:total costfaction MC:marginalcostfunction showmuchitcost toproducean X(q)= T,q) ADDITIONALunit. AC:averagecostfunction Pr >howmuchitcost toproducea MC unit. AC UntillMR>MCit is convenientto39 increaseq FocusforFIRMS=> PROFITMAXIMIZATION(M) *Revenues - Costs= p.q-TC(q = p.q - AC(q).q= q(p- AC) Tomaximize dr- 0 · aM((q)= 0dt with #R= 4 >howmuchIearnfromthesellofan additional unit.(marginalrevenue( Thestrategiesoffirms highlydependon theirpositioninthemarket: · PureCompetition: Firmsare pricetakersso MM= p=cost(q)sotheycan'tdecideto verypoftheir goodsbecause consumers willnotbuyfromthem anymore(12K1). Tohavethiskindofmarked. Lotsofsmallfirmsare necessarytosatisfytheoveralldemand (thequalityofthe gooddon'thavetobeimportant). Allconsumers are wellinformed NODEADWEIGHTLOSS=>We reachan EFFICIENTSOLUTION dr- O > p=rc isreachedwithout dt externalintervention IfM>0 =>firms are goingto enter the marked 1r =0 =) firmswon'tenterthemarked purecompetition Ina LONGRUNsituation in PC:M= 0 equilibriumcondition IfI'malreadyinthemarked. ↓averagevariablecosts if pAVC =>Iwill leavethemarked SHORT RUN Scomefromsame eq. p>AVC=>Iwillremaindinthemarked ↑1 leaving M remainingM- FC=> Iwillremaindinthemarked · Monopolist (2:0) Onlyone firminthemarked- ithas thepowerto DECIDEP. Desitioncome fromMAXIMIZATION ofPROFITS: dr- ⑧ >MR(q)= M((q)dt Sometimesthiskindofmarketis themostefficientavailable: NATURALMONOPOLY (ex.TransmissionofEEC This…

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